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AVOIDING THOSE WEARING PROPELLER HATS: THE USE 
OF BLUE RIBBON JURIES IN COMPLEX PATENT 
LITIGATION. 
I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary 
condition of the law which makes it possible for a man 
without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry 
to pass upon such questions as these ... How long we shall 
continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and 
authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of 
justice, no one knows; but all fair persons not 
conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I 
should think, unite to effect some such advance. l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The current state of technology has led to the creation of patents for 
previously unimaginable inventions.2 These inventions are incredible 
boons to society and mark significant scientific progress. To protect 
their creations, inventors file for patents that, if granted, gives the 
patent holder "the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States 
,,3 
However, while inventions as complicated as an engine the size of 
a single molecule have been developed, the juries tasked with 
analyzing claims to patents for such technology have not changed.4 
At trial, the parties are likely to call expert witnesses to attempt to 
clarify complex scientific breakthroughs,s but the matter discussed 
l. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95,115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd in 
part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
2. For example, chemists at Tuft University's School of Arts and Scientists recently 
developed an electric motor comprised of a single molecule. Heather L. Tierney et 
aI., Experimental Demonstration of a Single-Molecule Electric Motor, 6 NATURE 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 625, 625-29 (2011). Such a motor could be used to power tiny 
robots (nanobots) within the human vascular system, tasked with repairing damaged 
tissues and delivering cancer-fighting drugs directly to a tumor. How Nanobots Can 
Repair Damaged Tissue, INTRODUCTION TO NANOTECHNOLOGY (July 10, 2009), 
http;llnanogloss.comlnanobotslhow-nanobots-can-repair-damaged-tissue. 
3. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(I) (2012). 
4. See infra discussion accompanying notes 40-49. 
5. See Rojas-Ithier v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto 
Rico, 394 F.3d 40, 43 (Ist Cir. 2005) ("[A] factfinder normally cannot find causation 
435 
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may be so far beyond the comprehension, training, and experience of 
the lay jury that rational fact-finding is rendered impossible.6 
To counter the potential for arbitrary decision-making, and to 
create a fair jury for deciding patent cases, commenters have 
suggested the use of "blue-ribbon" juries.7 Blue ribbon juries 
"consist[] of jurors who are selected for their special qualities, such 
as advanced education or special training."s Nevertheless, in 
implementing these specialized juries there is a tension between the 
right to due process and the right to trial by a jury of one's peers.9 
Part II of this comment discusses the hurdles faced by the blue-
ribbon jury. In Part II.A, the tension between the Fifth Amendment 
and the Seventh Amendment will be explored. Part II.B discusses the 
difficulty inherent in empaneling a blue-ribbon jury in the face of the 
fair cross-section requirement. Presently, jurisdictions differ as to 
their preferred resolution of these tensions. lO 
without the assistance of expert testimony to clarify complex medical and scientific 
issues .... "). 
6. After resolution of a case dealing with slight differences between patents for similar 
hydrocracking catalysts, the jurors, two of whom were engineers, were asked about 
their understanding of the facts. Joseph Sanders, Jury Deliberation in a Complex 
Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. Sys. J. 45, 48 (1993). Said 
one of the engineers: "Nobody else was at that level or even near that level [of 
education], and.[the other engineer and I] were getting lost. Imagine what the poor 
school teacher, or retired cop or farmer ... were [sic] feeling." Id. 
7. See Kristy L. Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling For 
Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. I, 
I (1998) ("When two giant corporations engage in multi-million dollar litigation is it 
fair to ask a millworker, school custodian, receptionist, plumber, nurse's aid, 
housewife, and others possessing no expertise in economics or accounting, to render 
an accurate verdict based on average variable cost determinations and tax 
consequences of inventory accounting?"); see also LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling The 
Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through Specialization for Internet Law and 
Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. I, 99 (stating that, in 
complex litigation, a jury composed of "scientifically sophisticated members" may 
lead to more "fair" and "consistent" results). 
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 423 (4th pocket ed. 2011). 
9. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
10. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4506 (1999) (providing for special juries), and In 
re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 
(S.D. Ohio 1985) (recognizing that the blue-ribbon jury is "separate and apart from 
the rules of the United States District Court" and would only be empaneled if the 
parties mutually agreed as to (I) the implementation of such a jury and (2) the area of 
expertise from which to draw jurors), with In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 
429-30 (9th Cir. 1979) ("We do not accept [the argument for blue-ribbon juries]. 
Jurors, if properly instructed and treated with deserved respect, bring collective 
intelligence, wisdom, and dedication to their tasks, which is rarely equaled in other 
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Subsequently, Part III provides an analysis of current shortfalls in 
complex patent litigation that can be overcome by the use of blue-
ribbon juries. Part lILA discusses the lay juror's lack of fluency with 
the specialized languages in scientific fields as a hindrance to 
decision-making. Part III.B looks at the present shift, in light of 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,ll towards allowing trial 
court judges to interpret patent language as a matter of law, and how 
the use of blue-ribbon juries provides a better alternative. The blue-
ribbon juror's ability (or lack thereof) to wear the shoes of a person 
having ordinarily skill in the art (PHOSITA) related to the patent is 
discussed in Part III.e. Finally, Part III.D analogizes the blue-ribbon 
jury to the death-qualified jury as a call for empaneling decision-
makers who are able to comply with the instructions of the law and of 
the court. Throughout these sections, the ability of the blue-ribbon 
jury to provide a better alternative is discussed. 
II. HURDLES OF BLUE-RIBBON WRIES 
A. Tension Between the Right to a Jury Trial and Due Process 
When Implementing a Blue-Ribbon Jury System 
1. The Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[ n]o person shall. . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.,,12 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment such due process protection was 
extended to the states. 13 "Due process requires a competent and 
impartial tribunal in administrative hearings. .. and in trials to a 
judge .... "14 In Sullivan v. Fogg, a convicted defendant appealed his 
denial of writ of habeas corpus relief to the Second Circuit Court of 
areas of public service."}, and William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, 
Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping 
With the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67VA. L. REv. 887,913-15 (1981) 
(citing congressional hearings regarding the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 
that indicate the purpose of the Act was to mitigate, if not eradicate, blue-ribbon 
juries). 
11. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
14. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, SOl (1972) (internal citations omitted); see also In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in 
the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the 
probability of unfairness."). 
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Appeals alleging violation of his due process protection because one 
of the jurors "had a schizoid personality with paranoid features ... 
[and was] vulnerable to a paranoid psychotic decompensation.,,15 
The Second Circuit recognized that the "due process safeguards 
which are designed to promote thorough and accurate factfinding" 
should allow further inquiry as to the juror's competency and 
reversed the denial of writ of habeas cOrpUS. 16 
The inability of the jurors to understand the pleadings and 
arguments during trial is the fundamental reason courts will sustain a 
properly alleged due process violation when a juror is unable to 
competently understand the English language,17 or otherwise dismiss 
the juror upon proper motion,18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1865.19 By 
keeping those unable to understand the proceedings out of the jury 
box, the courts are able to prevent juries from reaching arbitrary 
decisions which can result in overturning a jury's findings on appeal 
or by collateral attack.20 
15. Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465,465-66 (2d Cir. 1980). 
16. Id. at 468. 
17. Lyles v. State, 41 Tex. 172, 177 (1874) ("If the trial by jury is to remain a substantial 
fact and an important right, and is not to be substituted by a legal fiction bearing the 
name, but wanting in the most important qualification of a jury, namely, the capacity 
to understand what the pleadings contain, what is said by the counsel in their 
addresses to the jury, and utterly unable to comprehend the charge of the court, then it 
is necessary that jurors unable to speak or understand the English language should be 
excluded from the panel."). 
18. See United States v. Paulk, 372 F. App'x 971,973 (11th Cir. 2010) ("The district 
court's conclusion that juror Pierre Cadet's English was sufficiently limited to warrant 
dismissal is supported by the record."); United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d 1359, 1367 
(4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 1992)); 
Guam v. Palomo, 511 F.2d 255, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Silverman, 
449 F.2d 1341,1344 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972). 
19. This statute, titled Qualifications for Jury Service, reads in part: 
(b) In making such determination the chief judge of the district 
court . . . shall deem any person qualified to serve on grand and 
petit juries in the district court unless he ... (2) is unable to read, 
write, and understand the English language with a degree of 
proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror 
qualification form; [or] (3) is unable to speak the English 
language. 
28 U.S.c. § 1865 (2012). 
20. See Lester v. Dunn, 475 F.2d 983, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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2. Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial Versus the 
Complexity Exception 
439 
The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury for 
suits at common law.21 However, a complexity exception has been 
carved out whereby "[t]he complexity of a case may justify the 
refusal to grant a discretionary jury trial motion.,,22 This is because 
the "primary value promoted by due process in factfinding 
procedures is 'to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. ",23 
3. Japanese Electronic Products and the Third Circuit's Embrace 
of the Complexity Exception 
Prior to Japanese Electronics Products, there was no specific 
precedent to uphold a complexity exception.24 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that "[ a] jury that cannot 
understand the evidence and the legal rules to be applied provides no 
reliable safeguard against erroneous decisions.,,25 The Third Circuit 
found it possible that giving an extraordinarily complex case to the 
jury to decide would "violate due process and therefore would go 
beyond the guarantee of the seventh amendment. ,,26 With that in 
mind, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals suggests three factors that 
may prevent a jury from properly understanding the content of the 
trial: 
[F]irst, the overall size of the suit,... ; second, the 
conceptual difficulties in the legal issues and the factual 
predicates to these issues, which are likely to be reflected in 
the amount of expert testimony to be submitted and the 
probable length and detail of jury instructions; and third, the 
difficulty of segregating distinct aspects of the case .... 27 
After enunciating this standard, the Third Circuit surmised that the 
Seventh Amendment should only give way to the weight of due 
21. u.s. CONST. amend. VII. 
22. Davis-Watkins Co. v. Servo Merch. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (M.D. Tenn. 1980), 
affd, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982). 
23. In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980) 




26. Id. at 1089. 
27. Id. at 1088-89. 
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process in exceptional circumstances after a detailed examination of 
the stated indicia of complexity.28 
4. In Re u.s. Financial Securities Litigation and the Ninth Circuit's 
Rejection of the Complexity Exception 
The mere proposition that one constitutional safeguard can be 
disregarded in furtherance of another constitutional safeguard 
through a judge-made law strikes some as abhorrent.29 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the purported 
complexity exception head-on in In re U.S. Financial Securities 
Litigation.30 The complexity arose, in part, from the consolidation of 
eighteen cases representing five certified classes.3! In dismissing the 
call for a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment, the Ninth 
Circuit was especially concerned with creating a slippery slope that 
may erode the jury system.32 Moreover, the U.s. Financial Securities 
opinion suggests that other safeguards are in place to sufficiently 
handle complex cases in which a jury verdict may be irrationae3 or 
hard to come by.34 In the end, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "in 
28. /d. at 1089. 
29. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427-28 (1956) ("'If it be thought that the 
privilege is outmoded in the conditions of this modem age, then the thing to do is to 
take it out of the Constitution, not to whittle it down by the subtle encroachments of 
judicial opinion."') (quoting Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 
1954)); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1128-29 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) ("The arguments supporting denial of a jury demand in complex civil cases ... 
are not appropriately submissible to judges sworn to uphold th[e] Constitution. To 
permit a judicial interpretation of a constitutional provision that destroys another 
constitutional provision is to place at risk the entire Constitution."). 
30. In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979). 
31. /d. at 411. 
32. Id. at 431-432. 
33. To overcome irrationality in jury findings, the Ninth Circuit explains that: 
[a] new trial may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 when the 
verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages are 
excessive, or the trial was unfair for some reason. And, a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 may 
be granted if there was not enough evidence to make an issue for 
the jury. These procedures protect litigants from the risk of a jury 
reaching an "irrational" verdict. 
Id. at 432 (internal citations omitted). 
34. Methods for simplification of a complex trial noted by the Ninth Circuit under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include the following: motions under Rule 12, 
judgments as a matter of law under Rule 56, separation of issues or claims under Rule 
42(b), and, appointment of a special master under Rule 53. Id. at 428. Other methods 
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view of the mandate of the Seventh Amendment, time might be better 
spent in searching for ways to improve rather than erode the jury 
system. ,,35 
B. Improving Rather Than Eroding the Jury System: Reconciling 
Japanese Electronics Products and U.S. Financial Securities 
Through the Use of the Blue-Ribbon Jury 
The tension between the Seventh Amendment and Fifth 
Amendment is most clearly seen where the trial court finds that 
honoring the Seventh Amendment and protecting the right to a jury 
trial would come at the cost of due process and lead to an irrational 
decision.36 Japanese Electronics Products and Us. Financial 
Securities represent diametrically opposed ideologies in the approach 
to handling complex litigation.37 As a result, while the Us. Financial 
also include stipulations to admissibility of evidence, settlements prior to trial, and 
summaries for voluminous evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006. Id. at 
428-29. 
35. Id. at 432. 
36. Compare discussion supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing circumstances that might 
necessitate use of the complexity exception), with discussion supra Part II.A.2.b 
(discussing the rejection of complexity exception in favor of other due process 
safeguards). 
37. It is worth a note to explain that the complexity in Japanese Electronics Products and 
U.S. Financial Securities came from both procedural and substantive complexity. In 
Japanese Electronics Products, complexity arose from claims regarding the 
Antidumping Act and antitrust violation laws. In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust 
Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1073-75 (3d Cir. 1980). Review of the issues would require 
the jury to effectively become accounting and marketing experts. See id. The size 
and scope of the trial was also considered as adding to the complexity of the trial. Id. 
at 1073. In U.S. Financial Securities, the complexity lamented in the trial court arose 
from both the magnitude of the litigation and the complexity of the issues; said the 
court: 
The time and effort necessary to read and understand 100,000 
pages comes a little into focus when one realizes that such a 
quantity of paper forms a stack over forty feet high (as high as a 
three-story building). In the alternative, one could say that such a 
quantity of paper would completely fill five large filing cabinets. 
Or, from a lawyer's perspective, reading those 100,000 pieces of 
paper would be like sitting down to read the first 90 volumes of 
the Federal Reporter, 2nd Series-including all the headnotes. 
The fact finder will not only have to read, but will have to 
comprehend, the contents of these thousands of documents. It will 
have to analyze the USF accounts and the accounts of many 
subsidiaries, not only as they exist, but as the plaintiffs contend 
442 University of Baltimore Law Review Vol. 43 
Securities court fancies itself as the vanguard of the Constitution, 
refusing to see the lapse of the Seventh Amendment,38 it is inevitable 
that the Fifth Amendment suffers with such a position. Similarly, the 
Japanese Electronics Products court believes it has found the best 
solution to this problem by outlining a test with a high standard to 
allow for a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment, thereby 
protecting the Fifth Amendment. 39 Both of these approaches 
inevitably sacrifice one constitutional safeguard in favor of the other. 
The use of blue-ribbon juries represents an improvement rather 
than an erosion of the jury system. While the public has often been 
critical of the jury system,40 the abandonment of a civil trial by jury in 
the majority of cases, as has been done in the United Kingdom,41 is 
they should have existed. It will have to listen to, understand, and 
remember-throughout the trial-months upon months of highly 
technical and often boring testimony about various aspects of the 
USF accounts, including the testimony of the various expert 
witnesses who inevitably will be called by many of the parties to 
give their theories of whether the accounting standards actually 
used were correct, and, if not, what the correct standards should 
have been. After receiving and evaluating all of the evidence, the 
fact finder will then have to apply this mass of information to all 
of the asserted causes of action, each of which is based on 
different laws and different standards. The finder of fact must 
consider, separately, the evidence pertaining to each of the 100 or 
so defendants so as to reach a correct decision as to each. Finally, 
the fact finder will have to figure out which of the 100 or so 
defendants are liable to which of the plaintiffs, and which of those 
defendants are consequently liable to which of the other 
defendants who cross-complained, and for how much money. 
In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 
(9th Cir. 1979). 
38. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b. 
39. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a. 
40. "In recent years, juries increasingly have been criticized as being ill-equipped to 
adequately decide the issues in the cases before them." Steven I. Friedland, Legal 
Institutions: The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 190, 190 (1991) (citing Jacoby & Padgett, Waking Up the Jury Box, 
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1989, at 51 ("[A] growing number of legal scholars think the 
[jury] reforms would make for more reliable, accurate verdicts."». See generally 
STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: DISORDER IN THE COURTS xvi (1995) (demonstrating 
through multiple examples how jurors can be illogical). 
41. Senior Courts Act, 1981, c. 54, § 69(1) (Eng. & Wales) (limiting the use of a civil 
trial by jury before the Queens's Bench to cases involving "a charge of fraud ... , 
malicious prosecution or false imprisonment, ... unless the court is of opinion that the 
trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or 
local investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a jury .... "); Piper 
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not likely to find a foothold in America. Mark Twain, expressing 
concerns similar to Judge Learned Hand,42 lamented upon what he 
saw as a fault in the jury system over one hundred and forty years ago 
in his semi-autobiographical book, Roughing It: 
The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, 
and a premium upon ignorance, stupidity and 
perjury ... Why could not the jury law be so altered as to 
give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools 
and miscreants? ... I wish so to alter it as to put a premium 
on intelligence and character, and close the jury box against 
idiots, blacklegs, and people who do not read newspapers. 
But no doubt I shall be defeated-every effort I make to 
save the country "misses fire.,,43 
While Twain's concerns lack the politically correct prose of today, 
his attempt to "save the country" reads as an early call for the blue-
ribbonjury.44 Prior to the American Revolution, English courts 
authorized the empanelment of professional juries.45 On these panels 
sat citizens with experience or expertise pertinent to the facts at issue 
in the trial.46 Now, though, few courts will allow for the 
empanelment of a professional jury,47 favoring, if anything, the 
previously discussed complexity exception.48 
The use of a jury comprised of those steeped in the knowledge of 
the field at issue may lead to the most favorable and fair outcome. 
Taking an ideological extreme is hardly the best approach to a 
problem as complex as the modem jury system. The blue-ribbon 
jury, unlike the complexity exception, is a means of keeping the 
issues of fact in the hands of the jurors. At the same time, like the 
Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981) ("Even in the United Kingdom, 
most civil actions are not tried before a jury.") (citing 1 GEORGE W. KEETON ET AL., 
THE UNITED KiNGDOM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS 309 
(George W. Keeton & Dennis Lloyd eds., 1955». 
42. See Park-Davis & Co. v. H.K.Mulford Co., 189 F. 95,115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
43. MARK. TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 343 (OxfordUniv. Press 1996) (1872). 
44. Id. 
45. Bertelsen, supra note 7, at 10. 
46. Id. at 10-11 (giving as example, matrons sitting on a jury charged with determining 
the validity of a pregnancy claim). 
47. Id. at 13-14. 
48. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a. 
444 University of Baltimore Law Review Vol. 43 
complexity exception, allowing blue-ribbon juries to decide complex 
patent cases will result in more rational fact-finding. 49 
C. The Fair Cross-Section Requirement 
One of the stumbling blocks to the empanelment of blue-ribbon 
juries is the "fair cross-section" principle. 50 While leeway may be 
given to the implementation of juror qualifications, the basic 
principle is that those potentially empaneled on the jury be a fair 
representation of the community.51 That principle has been codified 
to give 
all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury ... the 
right to. . . juries selected at random from a fair cross 
section of the community ... It is further the policy ... that 
all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for 
service on... juries in the district courts of the United 
States.52 
The Jury Service and Selection Act of 196853 provides the statutory 
basis for the fair cross-section requirement.54 Additionally, the Act 
provides a statutory cause of action to challenge a jury not taken from 
a fair cross-section of the community. 55 This fair cross-section does 
not necessarily require that any particular jury be a fair cross-
section,56 but that the jury selection process implemented forestalls 
the selection of a truly diverse jury.57 With that in mind, the 
implementation of the blue-ribbon jury arguably would keep a 
49. See discussion infra Part III. 
50. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,537-38 (1975). 
51. See id. at 538. 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (emphasis added). Previously, the federal standard for jury 
qualifications rested on the laws of the district in which the federal court sat. Thiel v. 
S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 221 (1946). 
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861. 
54. Morro v. City of Birmingham, 117 F .3d 508, 518 (11 th Cir. 1997). 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e) (2012). 
56. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,208 (1965) ("Neither the jury roll nor the venire 
need be a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect the proportionate 
strength of every identifiable group."); United States v. Johnson, 386 F. Supp. 1034, 
1035 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("[A] challenge to a particular jury because it consisted only of 
white persons is without merit unless it can be shown that this district's jury selection 
system fails to produce juries from a fair cross-section of the community."). 
57. The Supreme Court, in analyzing cases of purported violations of the fair cross-
section requirement, focuses on discriminatory selection processes. United States v. 
Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 568 (1970) (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 
(1946)); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 220, 225 (1946). 
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cognizable group-likely those with less than a four-year degree-
from sitting on a jury, thus violating the fair cross-section 
requirement. 58 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not ruled against blue-ribbon 
juries in the civil context,59 though they do violate the Constitution in 
the criminal context,60 In Fay v. New York,61 decided before the 
enunciation of the fair cross-section requirement, the Court 
summarized the benefit of the federal system in exploring different 
approaches to jury empanelment: 
The states have had different and constantly changing tests 
of eligibility for service. Evolution of the jury continues 
even now, and many experiments are under way that were 
strange to the common law. .. "It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country. ,,62 
This leeway for the states to experiment with different forms of 
jury selection requires that "the jury lists or panels are representative 
of the community.,,63 In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Company, a 
California jury venire was deemed unconstitutional because it 
omitted daily wage earners.64 The Thiel court emphasized that 
[r]ecognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for 
jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury 
competence is an individual rather than a group or class 
matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To 
disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and 
58. Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 10, at 914-15; see infra notes 66-(57 and 
accompanying text. 
59. Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 
108 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1597 (1995). 
60. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,529 (1975). 
61. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), abrogated by Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 
("Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition ... but the jury 
wheels ... from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive 
groups in the community .... "). 
62. Id. at 296 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, 1., dissenting)). 
63. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. 
64. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1946). 
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discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals 
of trial by jury. 65 
It is inevitable that the selection of a blue-ribbon jury necessarily 
requires drawing from a venire not generally representative of the 
community. Nationally, out of 234,719,000 adults in the United 
States over eighteen years of age, only 66,192,000 have attained a 
bachelor's degree or above-about 28% of the population.66 The 
empanelment of a special jury for complex patent litigation, in which 
case the greatest benefit comes from selecting a jury of those in a 
particular field, would create an even less representative jury 
venire.67 
This system inevitably undermines the democratic ideals behind 
jury selection.68 Nevertheless, as the discussion below will explain, 
the lay jury is likely unable to come to anything but an arbitrary 
decision when faced with complex patent litigation.69 Where the fair 
cross-section requirement grew from the desire to protect minority 
defendants from a discriminatory jury,70 applying the same 
requirement to complex patent litigation harms, rather than benefits, 
the litigants and should give way to the blue-ribbon jury. 
III. BENEFITS OF THE BLUE RIBBON JURy 
"Honest to God, I don't see how you could try a patent 
matter to a jury. Goodness, I've gotten involved in a few of 
65. Id. at 220. 
66. U.S. Census Bureau, Educational Attainment of the Population 18 Years and Over, by 
Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 2012, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, tbl.1, 
http://www .census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/20 12/tables.html (last 
revised Jan. 7,2013). 
67. For example, if only those who have degrees above a baccalaureate are considered, 
the percentage of eligible Americans drops by nearly two-thirds to just under 10% of 
the popUlation. See id. 
68. See Bertelsen, supra note 7, at 16-17 (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 296-97 
(1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting)); Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220. 
69. See discussion infra Part III. 
70. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1986) (discussing the history of the 
Equal Protection Clause as a basis for eliminating racially discriminatory jury 
venires); see also Peter A. Detre, A Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in 
the Composition of the Jury Wheel, 103 YALE L.J. 1913, 1927 (1994) ("Many courts 
have recognized that what the fair cross-section guarantee protects is the defendant's 
right to a fair chance at a representative jury.") (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 
78,100 (1970)). 
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these things. It's like somebody hit you between your eyes 
with a four-by-four. It's factually so complicated.,,71 
447 
A. Technical Fields Develop Their Own Languages Rendering 
Simplification of Issues to Layman's Terms More Harmful Than 
Beneficial 
Recently, there has been a growth of linguistic study of highly 
specialized scientific fields and the specialized languages developed 
within them.72 Such specialized language is called a Language for 
Special Purpose (LSP).73 Within these LSPs, specialized vocabulary 
is a keystone feature. 74 As a result, speakers of the English language 
will find themselves out of place listening to English speakers of a 
technical field engaged in a discussion using that field's LSp.75 
Moreover, not only will an LSP have its own terminology, LSPs 
"also have special ways of combining terms or of arranging 
information that differ from the [Language for General Purpose].,,76 
Communication between the LSP speaker and the non-expert is 
fraught with incomplete understanding. When the LSP user must 
communicate with a non-expert in the field-such as the expert 
witness testifying before a lay jury-the expert is forced to use 
general language rather than relying on the field's LSP to effectuate 
communication.77 As a result, "[t]he expert does not expect the non-
expert to achieve the same level of understanding of the terms used as 
7l. Judicial Panel Discussion on Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1127, 1145 
(1993) (quoting Covello, J., U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Connecticut, 
in response to a question regarding the use of juries in patent litigation). 
72. See SPECIALISED LANGUAGES IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: A MULTI-PERSPECTIVE 
ApPROACH (Carmen Perez-Llantada & Maida Watson cds., 2011). The field is so 
recent, in fact, that the First International Symposium on Languages for Specific 
Purposes was held April 13-14, 2012, and a second conference convened in 2014. 
University of Colorado Boulder, Second International Symposium on Languages for 
Specific Purposes (Apr. 17-19, 2014) (an overview of the 2012 conference 
proceedings and a preview of the 2014 conference program may be viewed at 
http://aitec.colorado.edu/lsp/). As of 2013, the LSP Journal is only in its fourth 
volume. 4 LSP JOURNAL 1 (2013). 
73. LYNNE BOWKER & JENNIFER PEARSON, WORKING WITH SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO USING CORPORA 25 (2002). 
74. Id. at 26. 
75. "As an LGB [Language for General Purpose-i.e. the native English language] 
speaker, you might feel a little out of your element if you overheard two 
meteorologists discussing the weather using terms like 'advection', 'helicity', and 
'radiational cooling'!" Id. 
76. !d. 
77. !d. at 28. 
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long as the general idea is understood.,,78 However, when an expert 
communicates with another expert or a semi-expert a fuller 
understanding of the content of the communication can be reached.79 
Ultimately, it is important to know a field's LSP to properly and fully 
explain the topic at hand.80 
As discussed above, the judicial system disqualifies jurors unable 
to competently read and write the English language, recognizing the 
fundamental requirement that, to render a fair decision, the juror must 
be able to competently understand the facts at issue, the law being 
presented, and the courtroom procedure.81 With the rise of LSPs, the 
English language is being broken into sub languages distinct and 
nearly incomprehensible to the lay person not familiar with the 
specialized language.82 This makes the case for blue-ribbon juries 
78. /d. (emphasis added). 
79. /d. 
80. Id. 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20. 
82. For example, the following exchange took place in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. 
IBM Corp.: 
The Court: Do you know what demand substitutability is, [Juror 
A]? 
Juror A: Well, I would like to kind oflook into that. 
The Court: Okay. And how about the barriers to entry, [Juror B)? 
Juror B: I would have to read about it .... 
The Court: All right. And how about reverse engineering, [Juror 
C)? 
Juror C: That's when you would take a product and you would 
alter it in a, or modify it for your own purpose; that is, you would 
reverse its function and use it in your own method. 
The Court: And [Juror D), what is software? 
Juror D: It's software. 
The Court: Well, what is software? 
Juror D: That's the paper software. 
The Court: What's the hardware? 
Juror D: That's the wires and hardware. 
The Court: And what is-do you know what an interface is? 
Juror D: Yes. 
The Court: Can you give me an example of that? 
Juror D: Well, if you take a blivet, tum it off one thing and drop it 
down, its [sic] an interface change, right? 
Kimberley A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365, 370-71 (2000) [hereinafter Moore, Black Box] (emphasis added) 
(quoting Rec. at 19,490-91, lLC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 
(N.D. Cal. 1978), afJ'd sub nom. on other grounds, Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 
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analogous to the due process protection requiring that jurors be able 
to comprehend the English language.83 Where a patent lawsuit takes 
place between two experts in a highly specialized field, the case can 
only be fully and truly decided by a discussion of the specific facts at 
issue. Requiring the parties and the witnesses to generalize the 
language and not rely on their LSP simplifies the proceedings to a 
point that ultimately detracts from the substance of the case.84 This is 
greatly exacerbated by the minimum English-speaking requirement 
for juror competency.85 When the LSP speaker is tasked with 
simplifying complex terminology and principles to laymen's terms, 
there is already a loss of deep and full understanding. 86 When this is 
compounded by the listener who only has a basic understanding of 
the general language, it is inevitable that full understanding is 10st.87 
The use of a blue-ribbon jury may be the best way to overcome the 
understanding limitation created by LSPs. With a blue-ribbon jury 
deciding a patent infringement issue, the experts and parties can 
explain the terms and distinctions of the patents at issue without 
resorting to simplified, general language that fails to specifically and 
wholly address the problem. In this way, blue-ribbon juries would 
protect the constitutional right to jury trials and avoid the arbitrary 
decision-making of a lay jury. 
B. Markman Took Interpretation of Patent Language Away From 
the Jury, Blue-Ribbon Juries Would Encourage Its Return 
Frankly, I don't know why I'm so excited about trying to 
bring this thing [patent suit] to closure. It goes to the Federal 
Circuit afterwards. You know, it's hard to deal with things 
that are ultimately resolved by people wearing propeller 
hats. But we'll just have to see what happens when we give 
it to them. I could say that with impunity because they've 
1188 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
83. See supra Part II.A.I. 
84. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. 
85. See supra note 19. 
86. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
87. The theory "that our mother tongue restricts what we are able to think" has been 
debunked in linguistics. Guy Deutscher, Does Your Language Shape How You 
Think?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.coml20 I 0/08129/magazine/29Ianguage-
t.html?pagewanted=all&J=O. However, some research has shown that a language 
using particular terms does imbue the speaker with a tendency perceive and make 
sense of the world in a specific way consistent with those terms. Id. 
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reversed everything I've ever done, so I expect fully they'll 
reverse this, toO.88 
1. The Markman Decision 
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., Markman owned a 
patent describing a system designed to track the movement of 
clothing through the dry-clean process.89 The independent issue in 
the trial turned on the meaning of the term "inventory.,,9Q The jury 
found that Westview infringed on Markman's patent. 91 Nevertheless, 
the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for Westview, 
reaching a different interpretation of the term "inventory.,,92 
Markman appealed the district court's ruling as a matter of law, 
arguing that interpretation of the claim was for the jury under the 
Seventh Amendrnent.93 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding.94 
In part, the Supreme Court decided that the "decisionrnaker vested 
with the task of construing the patent is in the better position to 
ascertain whether an expert's proposed definition fully comports with 
the specification and claim and so will preserve the patent's internal 
coherence.,,95 The Court stated that this furthers the policy goal of 
ensuring uniformity in the treatment of a certain patent.96 Claim 
construction, the Court admitted, is rooted in "evidentiary 
underpinnings,,,97 but is ultimately a "mongrel practice,,98 falling 
between issues of law and fact. 99 The Court therefore concluded that 
"submitting issues of document construction to juries" would be a 
disservice to uniformity .100 In effect, according to the Supreme 
Court, placing claim construction solely within the province of the 
88. Kimberley A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, District Court Judges] 
(quoting 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No. 95-CV-113 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996) (Kent, 
J.)). 
89. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996). 
90. Id. at 375. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 376. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 390. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 378. 
99. Id. at 388. 
100. Id. at 391. 
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judge serves a notice function to the populace by creating stability 
through well-reasoned judge-made decisions.101 
2. Markman's Ironic Twist 
As a result of Markman, "a trial judge must determine as questions 
of law the meaning of patent claims," which is a central issue in 
patent litigation. 102 The cautious judge is then inclined to make a 
ruling on disputed terms before trial and "may prudently enlist the aid 
of qualified experts to determine the meaning of the [technical] claim 
terms.,,103 A Markman hearing then becomes a mini-trial before the 
main event. 104 Markman hearings typically employ experts and 
require their own discovery issues and expert depositions before the 
hearing takes place. 105 
Ironically, while the Court in Markman intended to encourage 
stability and provide notice of patent claims,I06 the result is a decision 
on a claim that is reviewed de novo in the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals,107 and reversed roughly 40% of the time. lOS As a result, the 
noble goal of providing certainty is undone by the very means 
implemented to reach that end. 
Meanwhile, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals enters a land of 
"sophistry and fiction" when it states that trial judges, "in weighing 
evidence and making credibility determinations," are only making 
decisions as a matter of law.109 Inevitably, Markman hearings 
become as much about weighing credibility and making evidentiary 
determinations as any other factual inquiry. 110 The folly of the 
Markman hearing has been summarized as 
[t]he court and a bunch of lawyers get[ting] together. Not 
one of them is a person of ordinary skill, or even mediocre 
101. Id. at 390. See The Interpretation of Patent Claims, 32 AIPLA Q.J. I, 9-10 (2004) 
(discussing the notice function of claims). 
102. Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 911 F. Supp. 76,79 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
103. Id. 
104. Raymond P. Niro & Joseph N. Hosteny III, Markman: An Infringer's Delight; An 
Inventor's Nightmare, 3 SEDONA CONF. 1. 69, 71-72 (2002). 
105. Id. 
106. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390. 
107. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473-74 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane) 
(Rader, J., dissenting in part). 
108. Id. at 1476. 
109. Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333 n.7 (D. Del. 
1995). 
110. Niro & Hosteny, supra note 104, at 78. 
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or bad skill in the art. They then read-at least we hope they 
do--a document intended by statute to be written for people 
of skill in the art, so that the document need not include 
what those of skill in the art would already know. This 
makes as much sense as having an engineering paper 
interpreted for the class by the "D" student, or someone who 
hasn't even finished a year of engineering school. The 
whole idea is malformed from the outset. III 
In the end, the attempt to remove claim construction from the 
province of the lay jury sought to better promote uniformity with the 
hopes that a judge is better suited to make a determination of the use 
of technical language. I 12 Instead, the result is nothing more than a 
lack of finality to district court decision-making, causing some to 
lament that "the effect of [Markman] is to make of the judicial 
process a charade, for notwithstanding any trial level activity, [the 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] will do pretty 
much what its wants under it de novo retrial.,,113 The Federal Circuit 
Markman court, in following that path, and the Supreme Court in 
affirming it, ''jettisons more than two hundred years of jurisprudence 
and eviscerates the role of the jury preserved by the Seventh 
Amendment .... ,,114 This is so because, "while not technically a 
dispositive ruling, claim construction can have outcome-
determinative effects," and "drastically affect the prospect of 
settlement." I 15 
3. The Blue-Ribbon Jury as an Alternative to Markman 
Rather than eviscerate the Seventh Amendment, a blue-ribbon jury 
is a better middle ground that reaches the desired end-goal of well-
reasoned claim construction and stability of patent decisions. While 
there are constitutional issues with implementing a blue-ribbon jury 
system, I 16 straining one constitutional provision rather than 
eviscerating it altogether is arguably the lesser of two evils. 
The primary concern behind Markman hearings is the lay jury's 
inability to come to a consistent interpretation of patent's terms.1I7 In 
Ill. Id. (emphasis added). 
112. See supra notes 95-10 1 and accompanying text. 
113. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, 
J., concurring). 
114. Id. at 989. 
115. The Interpretation of Patent Claims, supra note 101, at 5. 
116. See discussion supra Part m. 
117. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390. 
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response, the Markman Court made claim construction a matter of 
law, "notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings," in the hopes of 
saving uniformity.lI8 As a result, these hearings become mini-trials, 
even including expert testimony to better enable a district court 
judge, not steeped in the language of art,119 to make rulings on the 
meaning of terms within a patent. On review, despite the goal of 
uniformity, the judge's decision at law is subject to de novo review 
with reversals occurring around 40% of the time.120 
The blue-ribbon jury solves many of these problems. On appeal, 
the jury's determination of claim construction is subject to a highly 
deferential standard, only being disturbed if a reasonable jury could 
not reach the conclusion the trial jury did. 121 While this standard may 
have its flaws when reviewing the interpretation of technical 
language by a lay jury, the same cannot be said when the jury is 
comprised of those reasonably skilled in the art of the patent at issue. 
If the trial court judge is better skilled at syllogizing expert testimony 
during Markman hearings than the lay jury during a trial, a fortiori, a 
jury comprised of experts in the field of the patent at issue would be 
even better equipped to determine the use of language in a patent. 
The end result is a trial less at risk of erroneous decision-making 
because the jury would be well-versed in the language at issue. 
Presumably, blue-ribbon juries listening to expert testimony, 
including the drafters of the patent and the purported infringers, 
would clearly understand (certainly more so than the lay jury or 
district court judge) the true intricacies of the issue and come to well-
reasoned conclusions in light of the facts presented at trial. 122 Given 
the critical appraisals of Markman hearings,123 blue-ribbon juries 
present an alternative to putting judges in the position of fact-finder 
vis a vis evidentiary determinations during a Markman hearing. 
These determinations have the added benefit of being more stable at 
118. Id. 
119. See discussion supra Part lILA. 
120. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
bane). 
121. See Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229 
F.R.D. 267, 281 (2005) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-
51 (1986)). 
122. See discussion supra Part lILA. 
123. See generally Niro & Hosteny, supra note 104 (discussing problems raised by the 
Markman process). 
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the appellate level-the motivation behind the Markman in the first 
place.124 
C. A Blue-Ribbon Juror is Better Able to Step into the Shoes of a 
PHOSITA Than a District Court Judge 
Nonobviousness is the standard against which a new patent is 
measured to determine whether or not it sufficiently differs from 
prior art in order to qualify for a patent. 125 Section 103 of the Patent 
Act explains that: 
[a] patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which said subject matter pertains. 126 
Section 103 creates an inherent difficulty in resolving patent 
claims-gaining access to the perspective of the person having 
ordinarily skill in the art (PHOSIT A).127 "The risk posed by 
assigning the evaluation to a decisionmaker who does not have 
ordinary skill in the art is that the [obviousness] bar will be set too 
low.,,128 
Obviousness, a fact-law inquiry, requires three steps: "(1) 
articulat[ing] the legal standards; (2) identify[ing] the relevant facts; 
and (3) apply[ing] the law to the facts.,,129 When this inquiry is tried 
before the jury, the jury may make a finding as to obviousness 
without any articulation of the facts that lead to such a conclusion.130 
Alternatively, a judicial determination of obviousness requires similar 
findings of fact and the weighing of evidence. 131 
As the procedure currently stands, it is not improper for a district 
judge to submit the obviousness determination to the jury. 132 
124. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 FJd 967, 989-91 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(Mayer, J. concurring). 
125. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective 
of Phosita, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 885 (2004). 
126. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. V. 2012) (emphasis added). 
127. See Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 885-87. 
128. Id. at 888. 
129. Wesley A. Demory, Note, Patent Claim Obviousness in Jury Trials: Where's the 
Analysis?, 6 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 449, 458 (2011). 
130. Id. 
131. See id. 
132. Jd. at 460. 
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However, as per Graham v. John Deere CO.,133 and KSR International 
Co. v. Telejlex, Inc./ 34 should the district court submit to the jury the 
question of obviousness, the district court still has the responsibility 
of reviewing the jury verdict. \35 However, the reality is that by 
requiring the district court judge to make a determination from the 
point of view of the PHOSIT A, "the district court judge must attempt 
to step in the shoes of a person skilled in the technical field of the 
patented invention and determine from that vantage point what the 
terminology in the patent claims means.,,136 
In Robotic Vision Systems, Inc. v. View Engineering, Inc.,137 the 
district court judge donned the shoes of an engineer with an 
integrated circuit background with those skills and degrees to 
interpret, as an engineer would, the terms "providing ... fiducials," 
"correlated ... heights," "disposing ... in a prearranged pattern," and 
"restricting ... to a predetermined range of heights.,,138 Few, if any, 
district court judges actually have a background to make a 
determination of these terms sua sponte, and, like in the Markman 
hearings,139 the judge must obtain, weigh, analyze, and appraise 
extraneous evidence including, but not limited to, treatises, dictionary 
definitions, and expert testimony.14o 
Probably as a result of the inability for an individual unlearned, 
unskilled, and untrained in a highly technical field to pretend to be 
otherwise, the role of the PHOSIT A has become marginalized in 
judicial decision-making. 141 "This approach has left the courts with 
considerabie room for active judicial review ... [and] has arguably 
disregarded the statutory language and permitted the issuance of 
patents on routine advances within easy reach of technological 
practitioners of ordinary skill.,,142 The relevance of the PHOSITA, a 
statutory requirement, has been further lowered by the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeal's determination that "obviousness" is a legal 
133. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
134. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). 
135. Demory, supra note 129, at 460. 
136. Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 88, at 6 (citing Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. 
v. Avia Grp. Int'l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
137. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
138. Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 88, at 6. (quoting Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 
189 F.3d at 1375)). 
139. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
140. Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 88, at 7. 
141. See Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 889 (discussing the diminishing role of the 
PHOSITA in judicial decisions). 
142. Id. at 889-90. 
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conclusion and therefore not granted the same level of deference as is 
a finding of fact. 143 Furthermore, PHOSITA's relevance has been 
mitigated by the Federal Circuit's elevation of the use of nontechnical 
evidence to being on par with the technical examination relevant to 
the statutory PHOSIT A inquiry.l44 The result is a move away from 
the statutorily set level of inquiry due to the inability of the 
factfinder, whether judge or jury, to properly and legitimately put 
itself in the shoes of someone well-versed in the field at issue. 145 
Submitting the question of obviousness to a blue-ribbon jury 
obviates the difficulties lay persons have putting themselves in the 
mind of someone with advanced, technical expertise,146 with the 
added benefit of finality to the ruling. 147 When a juror is asked to 
place himself in the shoes of a reasonable person, say, in the 
determination of negligence, it is generally well accepted that jurors 
are able to play the fictional role of the reasonable person because 
they can "draw on their own understanding of reasonable behavior, 
based on their experience of the world.,,148 The same can be said for 
the judge. This is diametrically opposed to either the judge or juror 
placing himself in the shoes of a PHOSIT A. The requirement that 
the individual pretend to be a person highly skilled in a technical field 
forecloses the ability to rely on one's every day experiences unless 
that person is highly skilled in the same or similar area. 149 
The PHOSIT A in Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell 
Technology Group, Ltd.,150 had a master's degree in electrical 
engineering. lSI The juror, who statistically speaking is unlikely to 
even have a bachelor's degree,J52 must put himself in the shoes of a 
reasonable person having a master's degree. Not only that, but the 
143. Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 705 F.2d 
1565, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
144. See Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 893. 
145. See id. at 896-97. 
146. See Deutscher, supra note 87, (explaining that understanding the world through a 
certain language, like an LSP, leads the individual to understand the world around 
them in regard to that particular approach). Inevitably, the result is that experts in a 
particular field are better attuned to the intricacies of the field and able to place 
themselves in the shoes of a PHOSIT A. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
147. This is similar to the discussion regarding Markman hearings. See supra Part II1.B. 
148. Steven Hetcher, The Jury's Out: Social Norms' Misunderstood Role in Negligence 
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633,654 (2003). 
149. See discussion supra Part lILA. 
150. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 09-290,2010 WL 3937157, 
at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 1,2010). 
151. Id. at *6. 
152. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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inquiry as a PHOSIT A is done at the time the patent application is 
submitted. 153 It is all but impossible to presume that a layman, 
without any training in a particularized field, can gain the requisite 
knowledge of the PHOSITA merely through expert testimony (likely 
to be far less informative than a lecture)154 and a reading of material 
on the subject. If the average person is able to fill the shoes of a 
"reasonable person," it is only logical that the PHOSITA is best 
attained by one already having knowledge in the field at issue. A 
jury drawn from individuals trained in the area to which the patent 
applies would be far better suited to assuming the role of PHOSITA 
than the lay person. 
This more rational conclusion has the added benefit of being less 
likely to be overturned on appeal. For one, as a finding of fact, a 
higher review standard would apply.155 More importantly, though, 
the blue-ribbon jury steeped in the language of the field would, 
presumably, be able to render decisions based on individual issues at 
trial, leaving a cleaner record for the appellate COurt. 156 
D. Blue Ribbon Juries are More Likely to Properly Follow the Trial 
Court's Jury Instructions 
In criminal cases, trial courts are permitted to empanel "death-
qualified juries.,,157 Death-qualified juries are juries "fit to decide a 
case involving the death penalty because the jurors have no absolute 
ideological bias against capital punishment.,,158 The basis for these 
juries, according to Justice Stewart, is that the juror must be able to, 
at minimum, consider the instructions given by the judge under the 
applicable law.159 In Wainwright v. Witt,160 the Court clarified that 
the inquiry is "whether the juror's views would 'prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and his oath. ",161 The upshot is that 
153. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. V 2012) (delineating that the PHOSITA standard applies 
"before the effective filing date"). 
154. See discussion of LSPs, supra Part lILA (indicating that the expert cannot even 
communicate to the lay person the full depth of the expert's knowledge). 
155. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
156. Cf Moore, Black Box, supra note 82, at 368 (discussing the lay jury's tendency to fail 
to decide discrete issues). 
157. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 516-18 (1968) and its progeny. 
158. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,supra note 8, at 424. 
159. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (1968). 
160. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 
161. Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,45 (1980)). 
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proper jury decision-making requires the dismissal of a juror who 
"would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.,,162 
The requirement that jurors be able to impartially apply the law in 
the case of death-qualified juries is analogous to this Comment's call 
for blue-ribbon juries. When a juror is unable to comprehend the 
facts and instructions of the case,163 it is a foregone conclusion that 
the juror will be hard pressed to faithfully apply the laws of patents, 
by putting him or herself in the shoes of a PHOSITA. I64 Inevitably, 
the result is likely a decision not in-line with the court's instruction.165 
Furthermore, once the patent juror is unable to follow the court's 
instruction, or the facts at issue, she may base her decision on 
"emotional or other irrelevant factors."I66 The jury's decision is more 
likely to be based on sympathy for David as he squares off against 
Goliath,167 than it is to be based on a full understanding of the facts at 
issue. 168 As is the fear that allows death-qualified juries, patent jurors 
may enter the jury box irretrievably vested on one party's side 
because the juror is unable to follow trial proceedings and the court's 
instructions. 
The blue-ribbon jury could effectively fill an analogous roll to the 
death-qualified jury. By using blue-ribbon juries in patent litigation, 
the juror is far more likely to understand the legal task at hand and 
reach a decision based on the facts of the case and the court's 
instructions. 169 This is particularly so when the juror is asked to 
162. Id. at 425-426. 
163. See supra note 82. 
164. See PHOSITA discussion supra Part III.C. 
165. See Moore, Black Box, supra note 82, at 368 ("[J]uries tend to decide whole suits 
rather than delineate individual issues, even when separate issues are presented to 
them via special verdict forms or interrogatories."). 
166. Id. at 372 (citing Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Trial, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 
1995, http://articles.chicagotribune.comJI995-06-12lbusiness/9506120025 _1-'patent-
cases-patent-suit-jury-trial). 
167. See Jonathon Taylor Reavill, Note, Tipping the Balance: Hilton Davis and the Shape 
of Equity in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 319, 366 (1996) 
("[J]uries also tend to idealize inventors. Before the jury is a plaintiff who, in using 
her talent, skills, and effort to invent something, has received the recognition of the 
United States of America. Such a person may inspire awe and therefore bias jurors in 
her favor.") (citation omitted); see also Jury Cases on Patent Infringement on Trial, 
supra note 166 (reporting on Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 902 F. Supp. 330 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995), ajJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 107 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1997) in which 
inventor Dr. Raymond Damadian sued corporate giant General Electric Co. for 
infringement of Dr. Damadian's patent covering a means of detecting potentially 
cancerous tumors through magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology). 
168. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
169. See discussion supra Part lILA. 
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assume the position of a PHOSIT A.l7O Just as the death-qualified 
juror is able to reach a decision for or against the death penalty,171 the 
blue-ribbon juror is able to place herself in the shoes of a 
PHOSIT A.l72 The lay juror, however, cannot seriously be expected 
to place herself in the shoes of the reasonable inventor who--
depending on the patent-may possess master's degrees in advanced 
scientific fields. Excluding the lay juror from such inquiries serves 
the same ends as excluding the juror who cannot possibly agree to a 
death sentence--ensuring that the juror can follow instructions from 
the COurt. 173 Blue-ribbon juries allow for better decisions in complex 
patent litigation and should be used for that purpose. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Fifty-six percent of patent claims that went to trial in the year prior 
to September 2011 were tried by jury. 174 However, jurors likely are 
unable to fully rationalize the complexity of the patent before them, 175 
depriving citizens of the freedom from arbitrary decision-making. 176 
Lay jurors put patent litigants at risk of reaching such arbitrary 
decisions. 177 
The implementation of blue-ribbon juries might ensure that those 
patent claims be decided in a non-arbitrary manner,178 but it must 
overcome the fair-cross section requirement. 179 This slight harm, the 
result of a rule rooted in protecting a criminal defendant,180 should be 
acceptable for an alternative juror selection process that solves more 
11 11 .11 0. • lRl pro DIems man n: crem:es.·· 
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170. See discussion supra Part 1I1.C. 
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